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THE "JURISDICTIONAL FACT" THEORY, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE FINALITYt
FoRREST REVERE BLACK
The relation of the "jurisdictional fact" theory1 to the general problem
'of administrative finality2 is one of the most perplexing in the field of admin-
istrative law. One of the pioneer scholars in this new field has declared:
"Administrative law is groping; it necessarily is still crudely empirical." 3
This appraisal is peculiarly applicable to the jurisdictional fact problem.
The case material to date cannot be reconciled or reduced to a logical sys-
tem, but it is believed that a careful analysis will indicate certain significant
'trends.
The multiplication of administrative officers 4 (commissions, boards, and
bureaus) has challenged and cut deep inroads into 'many well-established
doctrines. Old landmarks in the law are crumbling before this new assault.
The separation-of-powers doctrine has been "softened by a quasi"5 Until
recently,0 its corollary, "delegata potestas non potest delegari," had been
tThis paper was made possible by a Social Science Research Council Grant-in-Aid.
'Very little legal material can be found dealing directly with the jurisdictional fact
theory. The best single work by way of background is Dickinson, Administrative
Justice and the Supremacy of Law, in HARVARD STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(1927). See also McFarland, Judicial Control of the Federal Trade Commission and
.the Interstate Commerce Commission, in HARVARD STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(1933) ; Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson &'c. (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1055-82;
,(1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 738; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1037; (1932) 30 MIcir. L. REv. 1312;
(1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 478; Gordon, The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction (1929)
45 L. Q. REV. 459.
'Leading articles on Administrative finality: T. R. Powell, Separation of Powers &c.
(1913) 28 POL. ScI. Q. 34, 47, Conclusiveness of Administrative Determinations in the
Federal Government (1907) I Am. POL. Scr. REV. 583, and Administrative Exercise
,of Police Power (1911) 24 HARv. L. REv. 333, 441; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action (1921) 35 HARV. L. REv. 127; Tollefson, Administrative Finality
(1931) 29 MIcH. L. REv. 839; Hankin, Conclusiveness of Federal Trade Commission's
Findings &c. (1924) 23 Micn. L. REV. 233'; Freund, Right to Judicial Review in Rate
Controversies (1921) 27 W. VA. L. Q. 207; Hardman, Judicial Review &c. in Rate
Regulation (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 681; Isaacs, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings
(1921) 30 YALE L. J. 781; Burgess, Recent Efforts to Immunize Commission Orders &c.
(1931) 16 IowA L. REV. 52. See also Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 3; FREUND,
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) c. 15.
'FRANKFURTER AND DAVIDSON, CASES ON ADmiNISTRATIVE LAW (1932) Preface, p. vii.
'See Berle, The Expansion of Administrative Law (1917) 30 HAtv. L. REV. 430;
Haines, Effects of the Growth of Administrative Law (1932) 26 Am. POL. Scr. REV.
875; Hughes, The Republic after the War (1919) 53 Am. L. REv. 651; Rosenberry,
Administrative Law and the Constitution (1929) 23 Am. PoL. Sci. REV. 32.
'The expression of Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Springer v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 210, 211 (1928). Maitland said that "'quasi' is one
,f the few Latin words that English lawyers really love." H. A. L. FISHER, MAITLAND,
p. 161. No one can study the development of administrative law in America without
realizing that this phrase has performed yeoman's service for American lawyers.
'The Hot Oil case, Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), was the first
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reduced to an almost bodiless bogeyman continually inflated by argument
and deflated by decision. The court appropriately considers at least three
principles in a case involving the delegation issue: (1) the definiteness of
the standard laid down by the statute for the guidance of the administrative
officer; (2) the degree of necessity, in view of the subject matter, for the
delegation; and perhaps (3) as a practical element, the confidence felt by
the court in the body so entrusted with the power.7 The "rule of law" as
expounded by Diceys has been elbowed into narrower quarters with the
development of administrative agencies. Ernest Freund9 deplores this
trend: "Discretionary administrative power over individual rights . . . is
undesirable per se and should be avoided as far as may be, for discretion is
unstandardized power and to lodge in an official such power over person or
property is hardly conformable to the 'Rule of Law'." To those who have
been accustomed to rely on the judiciary as the sole protection of the indi-
vidual against arbitrary governmental power, the intrusion of administrative
bodies that both make and apply (with finality) rules and regulations to
particular cases affecting individual rights has appeared to be an unwarranted
regression to the days when St. Louis and his Frankish predecessors sat
under the oak tree at Vincennes and dealt out a rude and arbitrary executive
justice.10 The growth of administrative tribunals is responsible for a frontal
attack on the concept of "judicial supremacy."' 1 The older theory of the
relation of the courts to administrative tribunals was based on the idea that
both were parts of a single system in which the courts wielded ultimate
authority. The newer conception is that of a dual system of public admin-
istration of justice which recognizes a division of function between courts
and administrative agencies, to the end that some administrative determina-
tions are final while others are subject to judicial supervision.12
It is easy, however, to overemphasize the importance of such a classifi-
cation. It should not be assumed that the lines of demarcation between
these two schools of thought are clearly drawn. Not only has Congress
blurred the division line by creating hybrid agencies known as "legislative
to invalidate an act of Congress upon the ground of unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the President. This was also one of the bases of decision in
Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), which held unconstitu-
tional the NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT.
'See Black, The National Industrial Recovery Act and the Delegation of Legislative
Power to the President (1934) 19 CORNELL L. Q. 389.
8LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1927).
'HIsTORICAL SURVEY IN GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1923) pp. 22-23.
For opposing view see Wigmore, Editorial (1924) 19 ILL. L. REv. 440 wherein he favors
an extension of discretion.
"Green, Separation of Governmental Powers (1919) 29 YAIE L. J. 371, 387, 388.
"See Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 11; Pound, Justice According to Law (1913)
13 COL. L. REv. 696, (1914) 14 COL. L. REv. 1, 103.
'McFarland, supra note 1, at 3.
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courts, " but also the courts themselves have exercised a wide and unpre-
dictable jural freedom 14 in reviewing or failing to review administrative
findings. In this connection, the statement of Professor Thomas Reed
Powell is important: "The limitations upon the reviewing power of the courts
are and must be, in the last analysis, self-imposed ones."'6 Ana again:
"Judicial review of administrative action is always possible, if we mean that
the courts may always inquire as to its validity. But the courts have them-
selves established as a rule of law that in many instances where the power
of the administrative to act is lawfully vested, theyl will assume without
examination of the evidence the correctness of the administrative deter-
mination."' 6  No more convincing evidence of this phenomenon is needed
than a comparative study of the present status of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission in relation to judicial
review. These two independently constituted commissions charged with the
regulation of transportation and trade "arose from the same political and
social movements, the Trade Commission was modeled after the Commerce
Commission, and their duties and functions are similar in many respects,
yet ... the practice of the courts, broadly speaking, follows the first (single
system) for the Trade Commission and the second (the dual system) for
the Commerce Commission.' 7
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the protagonists of the two
rival agencies in government, law and administration, have been marshall-
ing their forces and skirmishing on many fronts. Almost three decades ago,
Dean Pound stated in an admirable fashion the respective claims of these
two schools of thought. He said, "Administration achieves public security
by preventive measures. It selects a hierarchy of officials to each of whom
definite work is assigned, and it is governed by ends rather than rules. It
is personal. Hence it is often arbitrary, and is subject to the abuses incident
to personal as contrasted with impersonal or law-regulated action. But
well exercised it is extremely efficient; always more efficient than the rival
agency can be. Law, on the other hand, operates by redress or punishment
rather than by prevention. It formulates general rules of action and visits
infractions of these rules with penalties. It does not supervise action. It
leaves individuals free to act, but imposes pains on those who do not act
in accordance with the rules prescribed. It is impersonal, and safeguards
against ignorance, caprice, or corruption of magistrates. But it is not quick
-Ex parte Bakelite Corporation 279 U. S. 438 (1929); Katz, Federal Legislative
Courts (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 894.
"'See Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 3.
"Conclusiveness &c. (1907) 1 Am. POL. ScI. Rzv. 592.
"(1913) 28 POL. ScI. Q. 34, 47, supra note 2.
"'This is the conclusion of McFarland, amply supported by evidence in his study,
supra note 1, pp. 4, 34.
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enough, or automatic enough, to meet the requirements of a complex social
organization."' 8
In the perennial struggle between the forces of judicial and administrative
supremacy, several doctrines have been developed and several ancient doc-
trines have been revived that have had the ultimate effect of contributing to
administrative autonomy although in some instances such was not their
pristine purpose. In presenting them by way of background, we shall
enumerate rather than discuss the doctrines that have given aid and comfort
to the adherents of administrative supremacy. 1 They are: (1) the non-
suability of the state or of the United States ;20 (2) the doctrine of the neces-
sity of exhausting administrative remedies before resorting to judicial
review;21 (3) the presumption of regularity attending administrative deter-
minations;22 (4) the Jeffersonian 23 and Jacksonian 24 interpretation of the
separation of powers doctrine, to the 'effect that the executive and judicial
departments have concurrent and independent power to interpret the law in
the regular course of their separate duties ;25 (5) perhaps the most important
"(1907) 4 PROc. AM. POL. ScI. Ass'N 232-3.
'The best presentation of the legal bases of administrative autonomy is Isaacs,
Judicial Review of Administrative Findings (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 781, at 786.
'Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60 (1906); Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70
(1908); Naganab v. Hitchcock,. 202 U. S. 473 (1906); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185
U. S. 373 (1901) ; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1895) ; International Postal Supply
Co. v. Bruce, 194 U. S. 601 (1904). Compare United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196
(1882); Meigs v. McClugn, 9 Cranch 11, 13 U. S. (1815). See (1908) 53 L. ed.
92 for list of cases, also (1906) 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 727, (1908) 13 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 932.
'See Note, The Necessity of Exhausting Administrative Remedies Before Resorting
to Judicial Review (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 450. An examination of this doctrine will
show that it is subject to many exceptions and that its application is more often based
on propriety than on lack of power. However, the legislature may provide that resort
to a series of administrative bodies is necessary as a condition precedent to judicial
review or the statute may attribute finality to the administrative finding. See Milhein
v. Tunnel District, 262 U. S. 710 (1923); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S.
210 (1908).
'In the Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (1879), the court said "a due respect"
must be given "to the coordinate branch of this government." In Shurtleff v. United
States, 189 U. S. 311 (1903), the court declared that the "presumption is a strong
one." In Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 Fed. 10 (C. C. A. N. D. Colo. 1900) the court
declared that the presumption "should prevail if there is the slightest doubt as to the
,correctness of an opposite allegation."
"Thomas Jefferson's letter to Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820 [ComPLETE WORKS (Ed. H. A.
Washington) VII, 178].
'Jackson's Bank Veto Message of July 10, 1832, 2 RICHARDS N, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESMENTS, 582.
'Taney, C. J., accepted the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian interpretation in Decatur v.
Paulding, 14 Peters 497 (U. S. 1840). Here, although a question of "law" was involved,
the court refused to take jurisdiction. Congress passed a general act providing pen-
sions for the widows of naval officers who had died in the service. A special resolution
was also passed at the same time granting a pension to the widow of Commodore
Stephen Decatur. The Secretary of the Navy ruled that she might make her election
to receive either pension, but was not entitled to both. Mrs. Decatur applied for a
writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to make payments to her under both the
act and the resolution. The case obviously turned on the interpretation of the reso-
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single doctrine making for administrative autonomy, is the court's self-imposed
jurisdictional limitation' known as the doctrine of "political questions." 26
This self-effacing attitude can be explained either because the court may fear
the vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits might entail,
or because the court may feel that it is incompetent or impotent to deal with
the particular type of question involved.
We are now in a position to analyze the role of the jurisdictional fact
theory in this continuous struggle for supremacy between judicial and
administrative forces. It will be shown that this theory is a potential
weapon in the judicial armory which can be utilized effectively to check the
rising pretensions of administrative agencies. The case material to date
will demonstrate that the courts enjoy a wide and almost unpredictable jural
freedom in the exercise of this effective weapon. We shall attempt to
evaluate the utility and limitations of the jurisdictional fact theory, and from
the welter of precedents it is hoped that there will emerge certain significant
trends that may "illumine the relation between commissions and courts, nmr
left obscure by the printed pages of court opinions.
2 7
The amorphous jurisdictional fact concept has plagued students of the law.
It is a hybrid creation, the component parts of which defy analysis. On
the one hand, the lines of demarcation between questions of fact, mixed
questions of law and fact, and questions of law have been so refined as to
lution granting the special pension, and whether or not it was intended to increase
the amount of the pension payable under the general act. But the Supreme Court
refused to take jurisdiction of this question, saying by Mr. Chief Justice Taney:
"The duty required by the resolution was to be performed by the Secretary of the
Navy as the head of one of the executive departments of the government in the ordinary
discharge of his official duties. The head of an executive department in the adminis-
tration of the various important concerns of his office must exercise his judgment in
expounding the laws and resolutions of Congress under which he is from time to time
required to act. . . The court could not entertain an appeal from the decision of one
of the secretaries nor revise his judgment in any case where the law authorized him
to exercise discretion and judgment. .. "
-'See Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in Federal Courts (1924) 8 MINN.
L. Rev. 485; Finklestein, Judicial Self-Limitations (1923) 37 H.av. L. Rav. 338, (1925)
39 HARv. L. REv. 221; and answer by Weston in (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 296, 329
et seq.; Potter, The Political Question in International Law in the Courts of the
United States (1911) 8 S. W. POL. & Soc. ScI. Q. 127. The Supreme Court of the United
States has held the following quegtions political: (1) territorial extent and de jure
character of a government, Foster v. Nielson, 2 Peters 253 (U. S. 1829) ; (2) existence
of a status of independence, war, or belligerency, U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610
(U. S. 1818); (3) whether a treaty has been sufficiently ratified, Doe v. Braden, 16
How. 635 (U. S. 1853); (4) whether a given person is an accredited diplomatic
agent, Ex Parte Baiz, 145 U. S. 453 (1891) ; (5) recognition of foreign governments,
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1917); (6) de jure character of state
governments, Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849); (7) power of calling out
militia, Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (U. S. 1827); (8) how long Cuba should be
occupied, Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109 (1900) ; (9) existence of tribal relations among
Indians, United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407 (U. S. 1865).
"Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv, 614.
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become illusory in many instances.28 On the other hand, the term "juris-
dictional" is not a word of art having a definite and precise content.29
When the component parts of this concept, considered separately, are -so
vague, it is idl to expect that clarity will result from the combination.
Further, it should be recognized that the jurisdictional fact theory has a
different meaning in administrative law than in the field of judicial proceed-
ings.30  On this point, Professor Freund has said:31
"Questions of fact in administrative determinations differ from like
questions in judicial proceedings in two respects: in the latter, where the
cause is one of general common law or equity jurisdiction, the question
of fact is practically never a jurisdictional fact, but one submitted for
decision, while administrative jurisdiction frequently presupposes the
existence of the fact as a jurisdictional prerequisite; and notice and
hearing is the normal judicial process, while administrative authorities
may be authorized to proceed ex parte, or their action may be minis-
terial in the sense of being inconclusive if they proceed upon an errone-
ous assumption of fact. If the fact is a jurisdictional fact, if the pro-
ceeding is ex parte, or if the officer acts ministerially, the question of
fact is open to judicial examination."
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court,3 2
recognized the distinction between the use of the jurisdictional fact theory
in the field of administrative law and in judicial proceedings in these words;
"The term 'jurisdictional', although frequently used, suggests analogies which
are not complete when the reference is to administrative officials or bodies." 3
In the field of judicial proceedings, the question of jurisdictional facts does
not raise a particularly intricate problem because the same court has to
decide all the facts, jurisdictional or otherwise. In such cases the question
is usually raised by an attempted collateral attack and is based on the error
of the first decision, not on the question of the power of the first court to
make final determination of such facts. Moreover,'it is the finding and not
I
'See TAYrER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, pp. 213 ff.; HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW, pp. 115 ff.; HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, pp. 232-238. See as
illustration of problem Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53 (1912); Dickinson, op. cit.
supra note 1, pp. 49-56.
'Gordon, The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction (1929) 45 L. Q. REV. 459.
'The jurisdictional fact problem is not limited to the field of administrative law. As
applied to judicial proceedings the jurisdictional fact problem arises as to whether a
summons was served [D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U. S. 1850)], whether the
court had jurisdiction of the res in an action of rem [Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall.
457 (U. S. 1874)], as to the fact of death of a person for whom an administrator was
appointed [Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch 9 (U. S. 1814)]. See VAN FLEET, COLLATERAL
ATTACK §§ 60-63.
'ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY, p. 293.
'Crowell v. Benson, 76 L. ed. at 614, n.
"See Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States, 224 U. S. 474, 484 (1911),
where the court said, "It is true that there may be a jurisdiction to determine the
possession of jurisdiction (Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 363), but the full doctrine
of that case cannot be extended to an administrative body."
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the existence of the fact per se that is controlling. If it were the latter, a
reversal on appeal, by removing the estoppel, would decide that the first tri-
bunal acted without jurisdiction. Such is not necessarily the effect of a
reversal.34
We are concerned solely with the administrative law aspect of the juris-
dictional fact theory. As restricted to this field, the doctrine has been
defined as folfows:
"Where a statute purports to confer on an administrative agency a
power to make decisions, but is construed as conferring that power only
over, or with reference to, certain kinds of objects, situations or acts,
then the fact-question of whether or not in any given case of such a
decision the object, situation or act was in fact of the kinds specified
in the statute goes to the jurisdiction of the administrative agency to
make the decision at all. ' 3 5
A review of some of the landmairk cases in the early development of the
jurisdictional fact doctrine (as applied to the older type of public officer)
will demonstrate that it is closely related to the ultra vires concept. The
jurisdictional fact theory is supposed to have made its earliest appearance in
Terry v. Huntington,6 decided in 1669, and Sir Matthew Hale is credited
with its authorship. This case was an action of trover for goods levied by
warrant of the commissioners of excise. The question was whether an
action lay against the officers if they adjudged "low wines" to be "strong
waters." Hale, Chief Baron, said:
"The commissioners have only a stinted limited jurisdiction, and if
they exceed it, that does not take away the jurisdiction of this court.
Special jurisdictions are circumscribed (1) with respect to place, as a
leet or corporation; (2) with respect to persons; (3) with respect to
the subject-matter of their jurisdiction; and the statute limits their
jurisdiction in all these three respects, and therefore if they give judg-
ment in a cause arising in another place, or betwixt private persons, or
in other matters, all is void and coram non judice, as if they should
adjudge rose water to be strong water."
Another early landmark decision, which illustrates the relation between the
jurisdictional fact theory and the doctrine of the liability of public officers,
is Warne v. Varley,3 7 decided in 1795. An act of Parliament authorized and
bound official inspectors to seize leather insufficiently dried. The officers
'Ashcroft v. Bourne, 3 B. & A. 684 (1832) ; Brittain v. Kinnaird, 1 Brod. & B.
432 (1819). See Gordon, The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction (1929) 45 L. Q. REv. 459.
'Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 1059. Chief Justice
Hughes in Crowell v. Benson said: "In relation to administrative agencies, the question
in a given case is whether it falls within the scope of the authority validly conferred."
76 L. ed. at 614, n.
'Hardres 480, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (1669).
'6 Durn. & E. 443 (1795).
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were held liable in trespass for a seizure, upon a subsequent finding by the
jury that the leather so seized was in proper condition. Lord Kenyon
said:
"This statute, after directing that searchers shall be appointed, author-
izes them to seize leather of a certain description .... It seems reasonable
that if these searchers exercise their authority bona fide, and only seize
such leather ... as in their judgment ought to be examined, 'they should
be protected . . . But the Act of Parliament affords them no such pro-
tection. It only allows them to seize leather which is not dried."
Ashhurst, J., said:
"The Act of Parliament only authorizes the searchers to seize goods of
a certain denomination; the goods in question are not of that description;
therefore the seizure is illegal and the defendants are trespassers."
This decision is predicated on the theory (1) that the condition of the
leather is a "jurisdictional fact"; (2) that the language of the statute pre-
cluded any construction other than the narrow one that the officers had
no authority over any leather other than "leather insufficiently dried";
(3) that the determination of the officers as to the condition of the leather
was not final but was subject to a reexamination by the courts. The" effect
of the decision was to remove any protection to the officer merely because he
acted in good faith, and this harsh view was enforced although the statute
did not contemplate seizure for the purposes of confiscation but as preliminary
to a subsequent trial.38 (4) Although the court intimated that it was con-
strained to its holding by the language of the Parliamentary act, it should
be noted that the court in accepting this interpretation as to the mandate
of the statute, in fact enjoyed a wide jural freedom to take a broad or a
narrow view as to what facts were "jurisdictional". It might have been
argued that the officer had jurisdiction over "leather" to determine whether
it was insufficiently dried.39 This interpretation would have clothed the
officer with a type of "judicial" power and with it would have followed a
judicial immunity. 40 Warne v. Varley, however, utilized the jurisdictional
fact theory in its strict sense to break down this immunity, and is historically
important because the jurisdictional fact theory became the entering wedge
as a method of control over public officers.
IsProfessor Freund criticized the holding in these words: "The statute authorized the
seizure for subsequent trial; under the circumstances it was absurd to construe the
statute literally as subjecting to preliminary seizure only the good of the forbidden
description." ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY, p. 249.
"In Seaman v. Patten, 2 Caines 312 (N. Y. 1805), it was held that where the de-
fendant officer was authorized to remove beef in danger of spoiling, his jurisdiction
extended to all beef which in his judgment he regarded as in danger of spoiling.
"Many courts accepted the theory that administrative officers exercising quasi-judicial
functions should enjoy immunity if they acted in good faith; see COOLEY, TORTS (2d
ed.) 479, 480-482.
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A century later, Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in another famous case, Miller v. Horton,41 followed the
Warne v. Varley doctrine. A Massachusetts statute provided that "in all
cases of farcy or glanders the commissioners, having condemned the animal
infected therewith, shall cause such animal to be killed without appraise-
ment." The court held that the order of the commissioners afforded no
defense as to an action by the owner for compensation against those who
executed it, unless the animal is in fact infected with farcy or glanders, the
statute providing no compensation for healthy animals killed by mistake
as diseased ones. The court declared that "the reasons for this construction
seem decisive to a majority of the court when they consider the grave ques-
tions which would arise as to the constitutionality of the clause, if it were
construed the other way."
This case strikingly illustrates the premise that the courts may extend
or contract the scope of judicial review of administrative action by apply-
ing or refusing to apply the jurisdictional fact theory in its strict sense.
In the last analysis, restraints on judicial review in this field are self-imposed.
The court would have been within its rights in Miller v. Horton if it had
accepted a broad interpretation of the facts that were jurisdictional and had
held that the statute conferred on the officer jurisdiction over animals for
the purpose of determining whether they were diseased. 42 This would have
admitted a judicial element into the officer's duties and he would have been
protected and his decision would have been final, if made in good faith.
But the court accepted the Warne v. Varley theory which permitted a judi-
cial reExamination de novo and added to the century-old theory the idea that
to permit the commissioners to determine conclusively the limits of their
own jurisdiction would look suspiciously like allowing them to determine a
"matter of law". 43
Terry v. Huntington, Warne v. Varley, and Miller v. Horton are the
judicial mileposts that must be stressed in any historic treatment tracing
the development of the jurisdictional fact theory. But it should be under-
stood thatthese cases were concerned with the older type of administrative
officer, and that in each case the officer was being sued for damages on the
theory that he had acted ultra vires the statute. With the rise and develop-
ment of the newer types of administrative officer, certain refinements have
been engrafted upon the historic jurisdictional fact theory. By way of back-
ground, we intend to introduce at this point an analysis of the recent famous
case of Crowell v. Benson,44 decided by the Supreme Court of the United
"152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891).
,"The broad interpretation is defended by WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC OFFICERS, § 133.
'See Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 52.
"1285 U. S. 22 (1932).
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States in 1932, in order that the reader may have a clear picture of the
nature and effect of the modem jurisdictional fact theory applied in an
actual legal setting.
This suit was brought in the Federal District Court to enjoin the enforce-
ment of an award made by petitioner Crowell, as deputy commissioner of
the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, in favor of the
petitioner Knudsen and against the respondent Benson. The award was made
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,45 and
rested upon the finding of the deputy commissioner that Knudsen was
injured while in the employ of Benson and performing service upon the
navigable waters of the United States. The complainant alleged that the award
was contrary to law for the reason that Knudsen was not at the time of
his injury an employee of the complainant and his claim was not "within
the jurisdiction" of the deputy commissioner. The District Judge denied
motions to dismiss and granted a hearing de novo upon the facts and the
law, expressing the opinion that the act would be invalid if not construed
to permit such a hearing. The case was transferred to the admiralty docket,
answers were filed presenting the issue as to the fact of employment, and the
evidence of both parties having been heard, the District Court decided that
Knudsen was not in the employ of the petitioner and restrained the enforce-
ment of the award. 46 The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. 47
The Supreme Court of the United States held that:
"... the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act contemplates that
the decision of the deputy commissioner in proceedings for an award
of compensation for injury sustained by an employee, as to the circum-
stances, nature, extent, and consequence of the employee's injuries, the
amount of compensation that should be awarded, and as to whether the
injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee, or
by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or an-
other, shall be final." The court then proceeded in the following language
to apply the jurisdictional fact theory:
"What has been said thus far relates to the determination of claims
of employees within the purview of the Act. A different question
is presented where the determinations of fact are fundamental or 'juris-
dictional', in the sense that their existence is a condition precedent to the
operation of the statutory scheme. These fundamental requirements are
that the injury occurs upon the navigable waters of the United States
and that the relation of master and servant exists. These conditions are
indispensable to the application of the statute, not only because the
Congress has so provided explicitly, but also because the power of
"44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. (1934) §§ 901-950.
"33 F. (2d) 137; 38 F. (2d) 306 (S. D. Ala. 1930).
"45 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
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Congress to enact the legislation turns upon the existence of these con-
ditions."
Crowell v. Benson introduced into our law a host of perplexing legal
problems.48  It is impossible at this time to predict accurately the effect
of this five-to-three decision49 on the development of administrative law.
But inasmuch as this is the leading case expounding the jurisdictional fact
theory in the Supreme Court of the United States, it is important that a
critique be presented.
(1) The majority opinion was predicated on the distinction between
"jurisdictional" and other facts. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the
Court, insisted that the locale of the injury, i.e., "upon the navigable waters
of the United States", and the fact of employment, i.e., "the relation of
master and servant", were the only relevant facts falling within the first
category. The court conceded that the decision of the deputy commissioner
as to all other facts bearing on the question of liability under the statute
should be final. The dissenting opinion questioned the validity of this line
of demarcation excluding all but two facts from the jurisdictional fact
category. Mr. Justice Brandeis argued that if the fact of employment is
pivotal and fundamental, why not the fact of the existence of the injury,
or the fact that the injury occurred in the course of employment, or the
fact that it was not wilfully self-inflicted. The dissent further countered
with the alternative suggestion that the employer-employee relationship
was only a "quasi-jurisdictional fact" going to the applicability of the sub-
stantive law, and not to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
(2) The court held that the locale of the injury and the fact of employ-
ment were not only jurisdictional facts, but constitutional facts as well. The
former was pivotal in order to bring the subject matter within the maritime
and admiralty jurisdiction; the latter, under the statute, was indispensable
for the imposition of liability without fault. The court declared:
"In the present instance, the Congress has imposed liability without
fault only where the relation of master and servant exists in maritime
employment and, while we hold that the Congress could do this, the
fact of that relation is the pivot of the statute and, in the absence of
any other justification, underlies the constitutionality of this enactment.
If the person injured was not an employee of the person sought to be
held, or if the injury did not occur upon the navigable waters of the
United States, there is no ground for an assertion that the person against
whom the proceeding was directed could constitutionally be subjected,
"See the notes on the case cited supra note 1. The most complete discussion of
the case is Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1055-82.
"Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court; Justices Brandeis, Stone,
and Roberts dissented. Mr. Justice Cardozo had not been appointed to the bench
when the case was decided.
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in the absence of fault upon his part, to the liability which the statute
creates." 50
(3) The second point upon which there was a clear clash between the
majority and the dissent involved the question "upon what record shall the
district court's review of the order of the deputy commissioner be based?"
Must there be a trial de novo or merely a judicial redetermination based on
the administrative record? The court held that the essential independence
of the exercise of the judicial power of the United States in the enforcement
of constitutional rights requires that the federal court determine such
an issue upon its own record and the faicts elicited before it. The dissent
insisted that neither the statute nor the constitution required a trial de novo
to determine the existence of the two facts that the court held to be juris-
dictional.
It should be noted that the' majority opinion did not hold that a trial
de novo was mandatory upon the lower court and must be granted as a
matter of right in all cases, but rather that that court had discretion as to
whether it would accept the administrative finding as to the existence of
the jurisdictional facts.5 ' The lower court having exercised its discretion
and granted a trial de novo, the Supreme Court of the United States found
that that court did not err in permitting a trial de novo on the issue as
to the existence of the jurisdictional facts. The court argued (a) that there
is no provision of the statute which seeks to confine the court in such a
case to the record before the deputy commissioner or to the evidence
which he has taken; and (b) as the question is one of the constitutional
authority of the deputy commissioner as an administrative agency, the court
is under no obligation to give weight to hig proceedings pending the deter-
mination of that question. The court said:
"The question in the instant case is not whether the deputy commis-
sioner has acted improperly or arbitrarily as shown by the record of
his proceedings in the course of administration in cases contemplated
by the statute, but whether he has acted in a case to which the statute
is inapplicable. '52
(c) The existence of the jurisdictional facts are essential conditions
precedent to the right to make any claim for compensation under the act;
and (d) this decision is in complete accord with the provisions of the
statute53 to the effect that the deputy commissioner "shall have full power
*"The doctrine of constitutional fact as developed in Crowell v. Benson applies to
constitutional limitations on administrative jurisdiction the same reasoning which the
doctrine of jurisdictional fact applies to statutory limitations." Dickinson, ,ipra note 48,
at 1067.5 See. discussion of this point in (1932) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 98.
"Supra note 44, at 63.
1§ 19 (a).
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and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of such claim".
(4) There has been considerable speculation as to whether the Supreme
Court rested its decision upon both the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment and on Article III, 4 or upon the latter only. The Circuit.
Court of Appeals5 5 stressed the due process contention almost exclusively.
while the District Court56 seemed to rely on both grounds. The real basis
of the decision in our opinion is to be found in Article III of the Con-
stitution. The court explicitly stated that for Congress to vest the authority
to make all determinations of fact "with finality in its own instrumentalities
or in the Executive Department ... would be to sap the judicial power as it
exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a
bureaucratic character alien to our system". 57
If the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment was the basis of the
decision, then state administrative agencies, such as Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commissions, would, under a similar interpretation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, be governed by the Crowell doctrine.
But if Article III of the United States Constitution is the basis of the
decision, the procedure of state administrative bodies will remain unaffected,
except to the extent that state courts give analogous state constitutional
pr6visions similar effect.58 There is an especially strong possibility of such
a development in those states wherein the state constitution contains an
express distributive clause5s ' separating the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial powers and prohibiting a fusion thereof in any department.
The dissent vigorously attacked the doctrine of the majority that to allow
administrative finality with respect to the two facts which were considered
"jurisdictional" would violate that "appropriate maintenance of the federal
judicial power which Article III requires". Mr. Justice Brandeis argued
(a) that "the judicial power" of Article III of the Constitution is the power
of the federal government, and not of any inferior tribunal. There is
nothing in that article which requires any controversy to be determined as
of first instance in the federal district courts. The jurisdiction of those
courts is subject to the control of Congress and matters which may be placed
within their jurisdiction may instead be committed to the state courts59
"Article III provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."
'Supra note 47.
"33 Fed. (2d) 306. Supra note 46.
"Supra note 44, at 57.
'See (1933) 46 HAv. L. REv. 478, (1§32) 32 COL. L. REv. 738.
5a'(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 414, (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 669-738.
"Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts (1925) 38 HAv. L. REv.
545; FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BusiNEss OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) pp.
65-68. While Congress has no power to force jurisdiction upon a state court, it has
the power to leave jurisdiction to a state court.
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or to federal "legislative" 60 courts. (b) The dissent further contended that
the power of Congress to provide by legislation for liability under certain
circumstances subsumes the power to provide for the determination of the
existence under those circumstances. "It does not depend upon the absolute
existence in reality of any fact." 61  (c) The dissent, apparently interpret-
ing the majority decision as being based partly on the due process clause,
argued that due process ordinarily does not even require that parties shall
be permitted to have a judicial tribunal pass upon the weight of the evi-
dence introduced before the administrative body,62 and further that the law
is settled by a host of cases that Congress may commit to an administra-
tive tribunal the function of collecting evidence.
63
(5) The court limited the effect of the decision by stressing "the dis-
tinction at once apparent, as to determinations of fact, between cases of
private right and those which arise between the government and persons
subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitu-
tional functions of the executive or legislative departments." Chief Justice
Hughes relied on Doe ax dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement
Company64 in which the court had declared that "there are matters, involving
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial
power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper".
Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determina-
tion of such matters are found in connection with the exercise of the con-
gressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immi-
gration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office, pen-
sions and payment to veterans. The court declared that "the mode of
determining matters of this class is completely within congressional control.
Congress may reserve to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power
'Katz, Federal Legislative Courts (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 894. If Congress in
creating a tribunal with judicial functions proceeds under the sanction of Article III
of the Constitution, then its creation is a "constitutional" inferior court, but if Congress
finds the sanction in some other grant of power then its creation is a "legislative"
court. Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438 (1929).
"
1At p. 85 of principal case. Professor John Dickinson, in developing this idea, has
characterized the court's attitude as "naive realism." The majority assumed that the
existence of a fact is something fixed and absolute; that the court has access in a
way that the administrative body does not to the fact itself and not merely to a con-
clusion or opinion about it. The court thus checks the fact against the administrative
body's opinion of the fact. Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. Rxv.
1055, at 1074.
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 U. S. 594 (1931).
3See dissent, n. 5, at pp. 69, 70, 71 of the principal case. Mr. Justice Brandeis
further argued that in instances in which Congress intended to permit the introduction
of additional evidence in the District Court it has so provided in express terms. See,
e.g., sec. 2, 42 STAT. 388, 389, § 2 (1922), 7 U. S. C. § 292.818 How. 272 (U. S. 1856).
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to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals." 65  The court
declared that the present case does not fall within the categories just described
but is one of private right, i.e., of the liability of one individual to another
under the law as defined. Congress, by recognizing this distinction, can,
in the field of "public rights," safeguard administrative finality from the
devastating effects of the Crowell v. Benson doctrine.
(6) A year before the Crowell case Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in a
public address, said:
"The power of administrative bodies to make findings of fact which
may be treated as conclusive, if there is evidence both ways, is a
power of enormous consequence. An unscrupulous administrator might
be tempted to say, 'let me find the facts for the people of my country,
and I care little who lays down the general principles'. 66
This fear was undoubtedly one of the motivating forces responsible for
this decision. Although all human institutions are imperfect and although
there must be a final tribunal somewhere for deciding every question, there
is deeply rooted in Anglo-American political thinking a skepticism toward
administrative finality. 67 One school of thought has always insisted that
judicially administered justice is superior to administrative justice. In the
discussion that follows we shall show that the finality which the Chief Justice
feared would not have been absolute even if the position of the dissent
had been endorsed.68 And it should also be noted at this point that the
fears of the dissent that the Crowell doctrine would hamper the efficient
administration of the act and clog the court dockets have not materialized.69
Thus far we have considered the jurisdictional fact problem in relation
to administrative finality almost exclusively as a struggle between the courts
and administrative agencies. It has been our thesis that in the ultimate
analysis as between these two branches of the government judicial limita-
tions are self-imposed and that the courts enjoy a wide jural freedom in
applying or refusing to apply the jurisdictional fact doctrine. The problem
becomes more complicated, however, when the legislature attempts to
immunize administrative orders against judicial review.70  In attempting to
'For this proposition the court relied on Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S.
438, 451 (1929).
6N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1931, at p. 18.
eFor the English reaction see HEwART, THE NEW DESPOTISM (1929); MARRIorT,
THE CRISIS OF ENGLISH LIBERTY (1930) ; ALLEN, BUREAUCRACY TRIUMPHANT (1931)
c. 4. For a criticism of the American tendency toward bureaucracy see BECK, OUR
WONDERLAND OF BUREAUCRACY.
"See Crowell v. Benson-Inquiries and Conjectures (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 478.
"Id. at 480.
"'See Burgess, Recent Efforts to Immunize Commission Orders Against Judicia?
Review (1931) 16 IowA L. REV. 52.
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answer the question, "to what extent can the legislature restrict the judi-
ciary in the application of the jurisdictional fact theory?" it will be well to
start with the English experience, wherein the immunization process has
been carried to extreme lengths.
Lord Chief Justice Hewart, in his thought-provoking work, The New
Despotism,71 protests against the belief "that Parliamentary institutions and
the Rule of Law have been tried and found wanting, and that the time has
come for the departmental despot, who shall be at once scientific and benevo-
lent, but above all a law to himself". 72  Let us consider the English
methods of delegation and immunization-by means of which Parliament has
created administrative agencies that are free from judicial supervision. Vari-
ous techniques are utilized. In addition to the general power to fill in
details and to "make orders-having the effect of law", (1) administrative
bodies in England have been granted the power, within limits, to repeal
or vary the express provisions of the act conferring the powers.7' (2) They
have been granted the power to suspend or modify the provisions "as they
shall think fit".74 (3) There are other cases where it is expressly enacted
that an order made by the Minister "shall not be subject to an appeal to
any court". 75 (4) Another device is to provide that the rule or order shall
take effect "as if enacted in this Act".70 This provision is apparently thought
to give the rule or order the status of an Act. of Parliament, the validity of
which cannot, in any circumstances, be questioned. (5) In several recent
statutes there appears the extreme provision that "the confirmation of the
Board shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this act have
been complied with, and that the order has been duly made and is within




"Under § 1-(2) of the Road Transport Lighting Act, 17 & 18 GEo. V, c. 37 (1927),
the Minister of Transport may exempt, wholly or partially, vehicles of particular kinds
from the requirements of the act, and by § 1-(3) he may by regulations add to or
vary such requireinents. See also § 1 of the Trade Boards Act, 8 & 9 GEo. V, c. 32
(1918). The Unemployment Insurance Act, 10 & 11 GEo. V, c. 30 (1920), by § 45
provides: "If any difficulty arises . . .whatsoever in bringing this Act into operation,
the Minister . . . may by order do anything which appears to him necessary or ex-
pedient . . .for carrying the order into effect."
71§ 10 of the Roads Act, 10 & 11 GEo. V, c. 72 (1920); § 6-45) of the London
Traffic Act, 14 & 15 GEo. V, c. 34 (1924).
7§ 9 of the Roads Act, 10 & 11 GEo. V, c, 72 (1920); § 4-(2) of the London
Traffic Act, 14 & 15 GEO. V, c. 34 (1924).
"The Poor Law Act, 17 & 18 GEO. V, c. 14 (1927) ; the Electricity Supply Act,
9 & 10 GEo. V., c. 100 (1919) § 34.
7§ 39 of the Small Holdings and Allotments Act, 8 EDw. VII, c. 36 (1908); The
Housing & Town Planning Act, 9 EDw. VII, c. 44 (1909) ; § 10 of the London Traffic
Act, 14 & 15 GEO. V, c. 34 (1924).
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"The excuses which are offered even by the most able of the apolo-
gists of the new despotism are sometimes rather entertaining. It is
said that Parliament simply has not time to do otherwise than delegate
legislative power; that Parliament, even if it had the time, has not the
requisite aptitude for the work; and that, after all, it is not the task of
Parliament, but the task of the Executive, to govern the country."7 8
To this argument, the Lord Chief justice counters:
"True, it is indeed the task of the Executive to govern the country.
But it is the task of Parliament to make the laws, and the real business
of the Executive is to govern the country in accordance With the
laws which Parliament has made. Is it not precisely because it is the
task of the.Executive to govern the country that it is so dangerous
to hand over to the Executive the power of making laws as well, and
of making them in ways which, while a kind of formal homage is paid
to the sovereignty of Parliament, have the effect of employing the sov-
ereignty of Parliament to oust the jurisdiction of the Courts ?"79
The general effect on the English legal system of this modern practice of
delegation to and immunization of administrative bodies has never been
more succinctly stated than by the Lord Chief Justice:
"The paradox which is in course of being accomplished is, indeed,
rather elaborate. Writers on the Constitution have for a long time taught
that its two leading features are the sovereignty of Parliament and the
rule of law. To tamper with either of them was, it might be thought,
a sufficiently serious undertaking. But how far more attractive to the
ingenious and adventurous mind to employ the one to defeat the other,
and to establish a despotism on the ruins of both! It is manifestly easy
to point a superficial contrast between what was done or attempted in
the days of our worst Kings, and what is being done or attempted today.
In those days the method was to defy Parliament-and it failed. In
these days the method is to cajole, to coerce, and to use Parliament-
and it is strangely successful. The old despotism, which was defeated,
offered Parliament a challenge. The new despotism, which is not yet
defeated, gives Parliament an anesthetic. The strategy is different,
but the goal is the same. It is to subordinate Parliament, to evade the
Courts, and to render the will, or the caprice, of the Executive unfettered
and supreme."80
"TE NEw DESPOTISM, p. 76.
"Id. at 77.
'Id. at 10-11. Mr. Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister, speaking in the House of
Commons on July 4, 1929, stated that in the three years, 1925-28, the average number
of Parliamentary acts was 50.6, the average number of pages occupied by them was
539; while the average number of Statutory Rules and Orders was 1,408.6, the average
number of pages, 1,844. See ALLEN, BUREAUCRACY TRIUMPHANT, p. 80. Mr. Allen
enumerates the apologies for this unusual delegation of power by Parliament to ad-
ministrative bodies as follows: (1) Urgency, growing out of emergency conditions;
(2) Technicality, many of these matters are claimed to be beyond the competence of
anybody but highly trained specialists; (3) Experimentation, subordinate legislation
enables experiments to be carried out in a way which would be impossible *if the slow
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It is obvious that much of this English practice could not gain a foot-
hold in this country under our written constitution with its express due
process limitation and its implied recognition of a tripartite system of separ-
ation of powers as evidenced by Articles I, II, and III. The correlative
doctrine, delegata potestas non potest delegari, which to many had become
a bodiless bogeyman, "continually inflated by argument, continually deflated
by decision," 8' was given new life by the recent "Hot Oil"5 2 and N.R.A. 88
decisions, and the separation of powers doctrine was rejuvenated in the
Court's development of the Article III contention in the Crowell case.84
What has been the American doctrine with reference to legislative attempts
to immunize administrative action against judicial review? ° (1) Suppose
the statute after providing that the decision of the administrative agency
shall be "final" is silent with reference to any right to a review of the admin-
istrative decision in the courts? The general rule has been that a statute
is not unconstitutional as contravening due process of law because it does
not expressly provide for a right of appeal to the courts from the decision
of an administrative officer or body. 5 At the basis of these decisions lies
the fundamental principle, that an implied right of judicial review is always
available, by bill in equity, certiorari, mandamus or other appropriate pro-
ceeding by virtue of the general law.8 6
In Dayton Goose Creek Railway v. United States,8 7 which involved the
parliamentary methods had to be used on each occasion; (4) Lack of time-Parliament's
time is exhausted discussing general policies. The adherents of bureaucracy conclude
with the statement that although "the powers delegated are perhaps in theory a little
wide, possibly, in appearance, almost tyrannical; nevertheless the public may rely upon
the administration in practice to exercise them reasonably and justly and even benevo-
lently." Pp. 82-90.
'Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Co., 71 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934), Government's
brief, p. 40.
'Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, spra note 6.
'Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, supra note 6.8 Supra note 57.
"For a list of statutes providing for administrative activity without any express
appeal to the courts, see FREUND, ADmINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROP-
ERTY, especially c. 14; Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 44, 45, 46. This practice
is to be attributed, at least in some states, to the uncertainty as to whether such
appeals are allowable under the separation of powers doctrine.
'The following eases illustrate the implied right to a judicial review of administrative
action where the statute is silent as to any method of judicial review: American School
of Magnetic Healing v. Annulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902); Public Hearing House v.
Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904) ; Noble v. Union Logging Co., 147 U. S. 165, 174 (1893) ;
Ng Fing Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922); Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111
U. S. 701 (1884); In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147 (1890); San Diego Land Co. v.
National City, 174 U. S. 740 (1899). Before the Hepburn Act of 1906, the Interstate
Commerce Act was entirely silent as to any right of judicial review of the findings
of the Commission. The enforcement proceedings in equity were used for review pur-
poses and it was presumed that this review was sufficient to satisfy due process. Of
the Supreme Court cases decided before 1906, the Alabama Midland Case, 168 U. S.
144 (1897), is perhaps the most important.
1!263 U. S. 456 (1924).
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"recapture" paragraphs of the Transportation Act of 1920, the objection
was raised that under the Act no opportunity was given for a judicial
hearing as to whether the return fixed was a fair return. The opinion
declared:
"No special provision need be made in the Act for the judicial
consideration of its reasonableness on the issue of confiscation. Resort
to the courts for such injury exists under Sections 208 and 211 of the
Judicial Code."
It should be noted that sections 208 and 211 are merely declaratory and
recognize the jurisdiction of the Federal district courts to entertain pro-
ceedings to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. This
practice has existed for some years before these sections were added to the
Judicial Code.
In Louiville and Nashville Railway v. Garrett,88 the argument was raised
that because a Kentucky statute empowering a railway commission to fix
rates made the order of the commission final and did not provide for an
appeal to the courts, it was unconstitutional. Mr. justice Hughes, in render-
ing the opinion of the Court, said:
"It is further insisted that the failure to provide for an appeal to any
court from the final order of the Commission, or for a judicial review of
the reasonableness of the prescribed rates before they became effective,
makes the statute void. But the statute does not deny the carrier the
right of access to the courts for the purpose of determining any matter
which would be the appropriate subject of judicial inquiry. We have
not been referred to any decision of the state court holding that the
statute should be so construed... In answer to the present objection it
is sufficient to say that there is no showing here of any attempt to pre-
clude such resort to the courts, or to deny to the carrier the assertion
of its rights."
In Reetz v. Michigan,9 a Michigan statute made the action of the Board
of Medical Registration final on the "legal question" whether an applicant
had been "legally registered" under a prior statute. The Supreme Court of
the United States said that statute was not unconstitutional merely because
it did not provide for appeal to the courts. The Court also declared, how-
ever, that "while the statute makes in terms no provision for a review of
the proceedings of the board, yet it is not true that such proceedings are
beyond investigation in the courts."90  In conformity with this federal rule,
-231 U. S. 298 (1913).
*'188 U. S. 505 (1903).
'The court pointed out that in Metcalfe v. State Board of Registration, 123 Mich.
661, 82 N. W. 312 (1900) an application for mandamus to compel this board to
register the petitioner was entertained, and although the application was denied, yet
the denial was based, not upon a want of jurisdiction in the court, but upon the merits.
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the decisions of the state courts support the doctrine that if there is an avail-
able and adequate judicial review existing by virtue of the general law, it is
unnecessary to provide one in the statute.91
(2) Another common legislative device is to provide that the decision of
the administrative agency shall be final "if in accordance with law".9 2
Obviously the clause "if in accordance with law" permits an implied right to
judicial review.9 3 The case material is in much confusion (a) because of
the difficulty of distinguishing between questions of fact, questions of law,
and mixed questions of law and fact ;94 and (b) because there is no com-
monly accepted theory upon which the actual practice of judicial review may
be predicated.95 The clause "if in accordance with law" is not a term of
art having a precise legal content. Consequently, its interpretation by various
courts runs the whole gamut of the legal theories that have been evolved in
the struggle between the forces of administrative finality and judicial
review.9 6
mCutsinger v. City of Atlanta, 142 Ga. 555, 83 S. E. 263 (1914) ; Wadley Southern
R. R. v. Georgia, 137 Ga. 497, 73 S. E. 741 (1912); Harris v. State Board, 287 Pa.
531, 135 Atl. 237 (1926) ; Coal and Coke R. R. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 132, 67 S. E.
613 (1910) ; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519, 139 Pac. 743, aff'd per curiam, 243 U. S.
629 (1916).
'For various forms of the "if in accordance with law" provision, see 0. L. Pond,
Methods of Judicial Review in Relation to the Effectiveness of Commission Control
(May, 1914) 53 ANNALS AFE,. AcAD. POL. Soc. Sci. 54-65.
"See FREUND, op. cit. supra note 85, 345; Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 1, 49; Brown,
The Functions of Courts and Commissions in Public Utility Rate Regulations (1924)
38 HAgv. L. REv. 140, 175.
'Isaacs, The Law and the Facts (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. I; Judicial Review of
Questions of Fact (1926) 24 MIcH. L. REv. 844; Conclusiveness of Findings of Fact
by Administrative Tribunals (1929) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 943. See also (1919) 28 YALE
L. J. 710; (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 413.
'Dickinson, op. cit. sipra. note 1, p. 50, n.: "The typical formulae for expressing
the scope of court review are hopelessly confused because of a persistent confusion
between at least three different theories of review' (1) the distinction between "minis-
terial" and "judicial" duties, resulting in the doctrine that the exercise of "judicial
discretion" is not reviewable even for errors of law, except perhaps where "impure
motive" or some other abuse is present. This theory survives most strongly in the
mandamus cases. (2) The "jurisdictional" theory of review, resulting in the doctrine
that even determinations of fact, where "jurisdictional," are reviewable. (3) The doc-
trine that errors of law, but not of fact, are reviewable. All three theories represent
developments in different directions of the nebulous fundamental doctrine that the exer-
cise of discretion within the limits of jurisdiction is not reviewable." See GOODNoW,
PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pp. 405-407.
'Students of administrative law are not agreed as to the line of demarcation between
the fields of administrative finality and that of judicial review. Albertsworth, Judicial
Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court (1921) 35 H~Av. L.
REV. 127, suggests the following analysis as indicating the pertinent questions involved:
(1) questions of procedure; (2) questions of jurisdiction; (3) questions of discretion;
(4) questions of fact. Tollefson, Administrative Finality (1931) 29 MICH. L. REv.
839, suggests the following analysis: (1) findings of fact; (2) discretion; (3) questions
of privilege; (4) mixed questions of law and fact; (5) errors of law; (6) adequacy
of process; (7) questions of jurisdiction; (8) arbitrary action-bias-bad faith-fraud;
(9) whether findings are based on evidence; (10) whether administrative remedies are
exhausted.
"JURISDICTIONAL FACT" THEORY
The general rule is that findings of administrative agencies, if supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive as to issues of fact.97 The courts will
set aside findings (a) if there is a complete absence of supporting evidence
on an essential point;98 (b) if the order is made wholly on the basis of
evidence which points in an opposite direction ;o9 (c) or is such that it could
not rationally have been reached by fair-minded men from the evidence ;100
(d) or where the inference of the fact-finding body involves an obvious
logical error;101 (e) or where the conclusion of the fact-finding body rests
upon an inference at variance with the known principles of physics or
mechanics.10 2
There are two types of cases that present grave difficulties and subject the
courts to the charge of usurpation: (a) where the court reverses the fact-
finding body's decision, not from the logical or physical impossibility of the
inference, nor from the total absence of evidence, but because the court feels
in doubt because it regards the evidence as meager and unsatisfactory in
character ;103 (b) where the decision of the fact-finding body is set aside by
the court as beyond the bounds of rational inference, without indicating
whether the impossibility of inference is or is not due to the operation of
some principle which the court" chooses to regard as a principle of law.'04
In either situation, the court is likely to be criticized for interfering im-
properly with the function of the body responsible for applying the standard.
(3) A statute may be declared unconstitutional if it is so construed as to
'Rankin v. Hoyt, 4 How. 327 (U. S. 1846) (custom appraiser) ; Decatur v. Paulding,
14 Pet. 497 (U. S. 1840) (pension board); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253
(1905) (immigration official) ; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904)
(post office department) ; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 (1881) (land office) ;
United States v. Williams, 278 U. S. 255 (1929) (director of veterans' bureau) ; Murray's
Lessees v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S. 1856) (summary
process against revenue official); Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347 (U. S. 1869)
(secretary of interior); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904) (post-
master general) ; Zakonite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 (1912) (secretary of commerce);
see note (1929) 14 CORNELL L. Q. 250.
'Union Pacific R. R. v. Milliken, 8 Kans. 647 (1871) opinion by Brewer, J.; Rowland
v. Boyle, 244 U. S. 106 (1916).
'Dube's Case, 226 Mass. 591, 116 N. E. 234 (1917); Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice
Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
'cSan Diego Land and Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439 (1903).
"
0 1Florida East Coast R. R. v. United States et al., 234 U. S. 167 (1914) ; Northern
Pac. R. R. v. Dep't of Public Works, 268 U. S. 39 (1925) ; cf. Louisville and Nash-
ville R. R. v. United States, 238 U. S. 1 (1914).
""Quigley v. Naughton, 100 App. Div. 476, 91 N. Y. Supp. 491 (1st Dept. 1905).
""See Mississippi R. R. Commission v. Ill. Central R. R., 203 U. S. 335 (1906) ; cf.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328 (1907).
I'NCompare Manufacturers Railway Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457 (1917);
United States v. Ill. Central R. R., 263 U. S. 515 (1923) ; United States v. B. & 0.
R. R., 231 U. S. 274 (1913). HOLMES, THE CommoN LAw, pp. 120, 121: "When a
judge rules that there is no evidence of negligence, he does something more than is
embraced in an ordinary ruling that there is no evidence of fact. He rules that the
acts of omissions proved or in question do not constitute a ground of legal liability,
and in this way the law is gradually enriching itself."
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preclude or hinder an adequate judicial review or deny a judicial trial de
novo where a constitutional right is claimed. In the famous Ben Avon
case, 105 the Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania acting on complaint
of Ben Avon Borough found after due notice and hearing that increased
rates adopted by the Ohio Valley Water Company were unreasonable, and it
prescribed a schedule of lower rates which it estimated would yield 7%
upon its own valuation of the property used and useful in the service. The
company, following a procedure established by the statute, appealed to the
state Superior Court on the ground that its property had been undervalued
and that the prescribed rates were therefore confiscatory and violated its
rights under the 14th Amendment. The Superior Court, passing on the
weight of the evidence introduced before the Commission, found the value
to be $1,324,621. The Commission's finding had been $924,744. Acting
on its valuation, the Superior Court reversed the order of the Commission
and directed the Commission to fix a schedule of rates that would yield 7%
on the new valuation. From this decision of the Superior Court, the Com-
mission appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, contending that the
Superior Court, in passing on the weight of the evidence before the Com-
mission, had exceeded its jurisdiction. The State Supreme Court sustained
this contention, reversed the decree of the Superior Court, and reinstated the
order of the Commission. The case was brought before the United States
Supreme Court on writ of error, on the ground that "the interpretation of
the Public Service Company law by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, re-
quiring the Superior Court to sustain the Commission's order if there was
substantial evidence to support it, deprived the water cormpany of its con-
stitutional right to a judicial review of the Commission's action." This
contention the United States Supreme Court upheld in a brief opinion by
Mr. Justice McReynolds. The Court said:
"Looking at the entire opinion [of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court],
we are compelled to conclude that the state Supreme Court interpreted
the statute as withholding from the courts power to determine the ques-
tion of confiscation according to their own independent judgment when
the action of the Commission comes to be considered on appeal ...
In cases of this kind if the owner claims that confiscation of its property
will result, the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that
issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent
judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void because
in conflict with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment."
"°Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920). For dis-
cussion, see Green, The Ohio Valley Water Case (1921) 4 ILL. L. Q. 44; Freund, The
Right to Judicial Review in Rate Controversies (1921) 27 W. VA. L. Q. 205; Weil,
Administrative Finality (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 447; Hardnan, Judicial Review as a
Requirement of Due Process in Rate Regulations (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 681; Alberts-
worth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court (1921)
35 HARV. L. REv. 127; Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 195-203.
"JURISDICTIONAL FACT" THEORY
The United States Supreme Court, after considering the "statements by the
state Supreme Court ... and admitted local practice", found that section 31
of the act providing for injunctive relief "did not offer an opportunity to.
test the order so clear and definite that the plaintiff in error was obligated to,
proceed thereunder or suffer the loss of rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution." The decision in the Ben Avon case concluded with these
words:
"Plaintiff in error has not !ad proper opportunity for an adequate
judicial hearing as to confiscation; and unless such an apportunity is now
available, and can be definitely indicated by the court below in the
exercise of its power, finally to construe laws of the state (including, of
course, section 31), the challenged order is invalid. The judgment of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania must be reversed and the cause
remanded there, with instructions to take further action not inconsistent
with this opinion."
The Ben Avon decision has been subjected to a barrage of criticism
(A) The Court held that whether a rate is confiscatory or non-confiscatory
is a judicial question. It has been urged that a question of value is a matter
of opinion; that there is no right to one decision rather than another so long
as the decision is fairly reached.1 6 If it is difficult to find the line between
a reasonable and an unreasonable rate, it will pass the wit of commissions.
and courts to differentiate "unreasonably low but not confiscatory" from "so,
unreasonably low as to be confiscatory," considering that the maximum rate
or return conformable to due process has never been fixed.1° 7 Hence the
Court is accused of confusing the inevitable differences in fair valuation
with confiscatory valuation. On the other hand, it might be argued that
since the Court's valuation was forty percent in excess of the Commission's
valuation, it follows that a seven percent return on the Court's, valuation
would be equivalent to a ten percent return on the Commission's valuation.
The query might be raised, in the face of how great a discrepancy can it be
maintained that there is no abuse of discretion and that there was substantial
evidence to support the Commission's findings?
(B) It has been contended that there are ample precedents wherein the
Supreme Court has upheld statutes giving administrative bodies final determi-
nation of valuation in cases of condemnation'08 and taxation, 10 9 and it is
insisted that the same rule should apply to valuation for rate making." 0  In
answer to this contention, a distinction has been drawn between rate making
"Freund, supra note 105.
:
1
°FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY, p. 298.
"°Long Island Water Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 (1896).
"P. C. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1893).
"'Hardman, supra note 105.
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and condemnation or taxation. The latter are purely administrative; the
former is legislative. It is argued that if the legislature had set the rate
directly, there would have been court review. Why should the rule be dif-
ferent when the legislature speaks through its mouthpiece, the Commis-
sion?"' It is insisted that the argument that the Commission is competent
does not answer the problem. The real question is, can the court sur-
render the judicial function of passing on the constitutionality of the rate
when the charge is made that it is confiscatory in violation of the 14th
Amendment?
(C) It has been asserted that the court was confused in its analysis of
the scope 'of the concept, "independent judgment of the court," to which it
said an appellant was entitled on the question of confiscation or constitu-
tionality. It has been suggested that "independent judgment" does not ex-
tend to subsidiary questions bearing on constitutionality, but only to the
ultimate question of constitutionality ;112 that if the former power is asserted
by the courts, it will reduce the administrative body to a nullity with a barren
power of initial recommendation; that it will destroy the effectiveness of
administrative regulation and that it will reduplicate the uncertainty of any
particular regulation. It is claimed that such a power would give the courts
the right to examine all the evidence de novo," 3 and that by analogy such a
procedure would be tantamount to requiring a court to substitute its con-
clusions from the evidence for the jury's. Further, it has been asserted
that the doctrine of the majority in the Ben Avon case is unworkable be-
cause it in effect makes the court an assessing authority." 4 The defenders
of the decision counter with the argument that valuation is an integral part
of the rate making process; that when the confiscation issue is raised it is
unrealistic to treat valuation as a subsidiary question; and that the utility
under the 14th Amendment is entitled to -a court review on the judicial
question of confiscation or non-confiscation. One thing is certain: from
the vantage ground of the present-fifteen years after the Ben Avon de-
cision-it cannot be gainsaid that many of the predictions of the critics were
rash and unreliable.
(4) Another famous case wherein a legislative attempt to immunize an
administrative determination from judicial review was ineffective is Southern
Railway Company v. Virginia."5  A Virginia statute provided that when-
'Green, supra note 105.
'Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 195-203.
'See Albertswortb, supra note 105.
'
1 See Freund, supra note 105.
t1290 U. S. 190 (1933). See Black, Does Due Process of Law Require an Advance
Notice and Hearing Before a License is Issued Under the A. A. A.? (1935) 2 U. op
CHi. L. REv. 270.
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ever, in the opinion of the Highway Commissioner, it should become neces-
sary, for reasons of public safety and convenience, to eliminate dangerous
railroad crossings over state highways, the Commissioner should notify and
submit plans for their elimination to the railroad maintaining the dangerous.
crossings. In the event of disagreement, the railroad might, within sixty
days, petition the State Corporation Commission for the substitution of its-
own plans for those of the Commissioner, at which time, upon the hearing
and adjudication, one of the plans would be approved. The Court held that
the failure to provide for a hearing prior to, or an adequate judicial review-
of, the Commissioner's original decision whether the crossing was dangerous.
and required elimination, was a denial of due process rendering the statute
unconstitutional.
The majority of the Court decided that the fact findings of the Commis-
sioner (as to the necessity of eliminating the grade crossings) were made
conclusive by the statute and could not be attacked in collateral proceedings.,
The Court said :116
"Undoubtedly, it attempts to give to an administrative officer power to
make a final determination in respect of facts-the character of a cross-
ing and what is necessary for the public safety and convenience-without
notice, without hearing, without evidence; and upon this ex parte find-
ings not subject to general review, to ordain that expenditures shall be
made for erecting a new structure. The thing so authorized is no mere
police regulation."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, upholding the Commissioner's
order, said:
"The railroad is not without remedy. Should the power vested in the
Highway Commissioner be arbitrarily exercised, equity's long arm will
stay his hand."
The Supreme Court of the United States rejected this contention in the
following words:
"By sanctioning the order directing- the Railway to proceed, it, in
effect, approved action taken without hearing, without evidence, without
opportunity to know the basis therefor. This was to rule that such
action was not necessarily 'arbitrary'. There is nothing to indicate what
that court would deem arbitrary action or how this could be established
in the absence of evidence or hearing. In circumstances like those here-
disclosed no contestant could have fair opportunity for relief in a court"
of equity. There would be nothing to show the grounds upon which the
Commissioner based his conclusion. He alone would be cognizant of the
mental processes which begot his urgent opinion. The infirmities of the
enactment are not relieved by an indefinite right of review in respect of
Mp. 195.
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some action spoken of as arbitrary. Before its property can be taken
under the edict of an administrative officer the appellant is entitled to a
fair hearing upon the fundamental facts. This has not been accorded."
Although the case contains some troublesome dicta, it is submitted that
under a proper doctrine of stare decisis, Southern Railway v. Virginia
stands for the proposition that a state statute which attempts to authorize
an administrative officer to require railway companies to eliminate existing
grade crossings and substitute overhead crossings whenever, in his opinion,
this is necessary for the public safety and convenience, and which provides
no notice to or hearing of a company on the existence of such necessity and
no means of reviewing the officer's decision of it, violates the due process of
law clause of the 14th Amendment. The fatal defect, according to the Court,
lies in the fact that the statute makes the administrative determination final,
not subject to review and not subject to an attack in collateral proceedings.
(5) The legislature may attempt to immunize administrative determina-
tions by imposing severe cumulative penalties to prevent the litigating of the
validity of the statute and the administrative order made thereunder. That
such an attempt will be unavailing is shown by the leading case of Ex parte
Young.117 In the Young case, there was involved an order by state authori-
ties requiring a public utility to put into immediate effect a substantial re-
duction in freight and passenger rates, under severe statutory penalties in
case of refusal to comply. The new rates were established without giving
the railroad company an opportunity for a hearing. The court in comment-
ing on the statute said:
"For disobedience to the freight act the officers, directors, agents and
employees of the company are made guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction each may be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for
a period not exceeding ninety days. Each violation would be a separate
offense, and, therefore, might result in imprisonment of the various
agents of the company who would dare disobey for a term of ninety days
each for each offense. Disobedience to the passenger rate act renders
the party guilty of a felony and subject to a fine not exceeding five
thousand dollars or imprisonment in the state prison for a period not
exceeding five years, or both fine and imprisonment. The sale of each
ticket above the price permitted by the act would be a violation thereof.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the company to obtain officers,
agents or employees willing to carry on its affairs except in obedience to
the act and orders in question. The company itself would also, in case
of disobedience, be liable to the immense fines provided for in violating
orders of the Commission. The company, in order to test the validity
of the acts, must find some agent or employee to disobey them at the risk
stated....
-t7209 U. S. 123 (1908).
"JURISDICTIONAL FACT" THEORY
"The necessary effect and result of such legislation must be to pre-
clude a resort to the courts (either state or Federal) for the purpose of
testing its validity. The officers and employes could not be expected to
disobey any of the provisions of the act or orders at the risk of such fines
and penalties being imposed upon them, in case the court should decide
that the law was valid. The result would be a denial of any hearing to
the company .... It may therefore be said that when the penalties for
disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to
intimidate the company and its officers from resorting to the courts to
test the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as if the law in
terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of laws
which deeply affect its rights... We hold, therefore, that the provisions
of the acts relating to the enforcement of the rates, either for freight or
passengers, by imposing such enormous fines and possible imprisonment
as a result of an unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws them-
selves, are unconstitutional on their face, without regard to the question
of the insufficiency of those rates."118
Mr. Justice Cardozo has said: "A fertile source of perversion in constitu-
tional theory is the tyranny of labels.""19  It is a grievous-error and a glar-
ing illustration of this "tyranny of labels" to assume, merely because a
statute contains severe penalties, that ergo, the Ex parte Young doctrine
applies. It is imperative that we analyze and distinguish between various
types of penalties. (a) Read in the light of the whole statute, is the penalty
section imposed to prevent litigating the validity of the statute or is it im-
posed for violating it ?120 (b) The question whether a penalty is unreason-
able as constituting "an excessive fine" within the meaning of the 8th Amend-
ment, or as a deprivation of due process of law or of the equal protection of
"
81d. at 147.
'Snyder v. Mass., 291 U. S. 97, 114 (1934).
'Mr. Justice Lamar speaking for the court in Wadley Southern Railway v. Georgia,
235 U. S. 651, 662 (1914) developed this distinction. After referring to the Young
case and others of a similar pattern, he said: "These cases do not proceed upon the
idea that there is any want of power to prescribe penalties heavy enough to compel
obedience to administrative orders, but they are all based upon the fundamental proposi-
tion that under the constitution, penalties cannot be collected if they operate to deter
an interested party from testing the validity of legislative rates or orders legislative in
their nature. . . .A statute therefore which imposes heavy penalties for violations of
commands of an unascertained quality, is in its nature, somewhat akin to an ex post
facto law since it punishes for an act done when the legality of the common has not
been authoritatively determined. . . He must either obey what may finally be held to
be a void order, or disobey what may ultimately be held to be a lawful order.
If a statute could constitutionally impose heavy penalties for violation of com-
mands of such disputable and uncertain legality, the result inevitably would be
that the carrier would yield to void orders, rather than risk the enormous cumulative
or confiscatory punishment that might be imposed if they should thereafter be declared
to be valid."
For cases holding that penalties are so severe as to deter complaining parties from
seeking the courts, see Van Dyke v. Geary, 218 Fed. 111 (D. Ariz. 1914) ; Bonnett v.
Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885 (1908).
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laws, depends upon the circumstances. 121 (c) At least two courts' 22 have heldl
that a "not-more-than" penalty statute is not open to the criticism of being-
excessive, and for that reason void, and issues based on the size of the penalty
cannot be settled until the size of the penalty has been determined. (d) The
nature of the suit, whether by the government or at the iristance of the com-
plaining citizen, and (e) the time of bringing suit, whether before or after
violation of the statute, are material considerations that have a direct bearing
on the question as to whether the penalty section is valid or invalid. (f) The-
point is often pertinent whether a fair interpretation of the statute permits.
penalties to run during good faith litigation or whether they are suspended
pendente lite. If the latter interpretation prevails, the case will be taken out
of the Ex parte Young doctrine.123 (g) Finally, the penalty provision as to
fines (if invalid) may be construed as separable. This doctrine of separa-
bility furnishes one of the handiest detours around the Ex parte Young
doctrine. 1
24
The foregoing analysis of five types of legislative effort to immunize ad-
ministrative tribunals from court review demonstrates the general futility of
such' a procedure. Within a limited field it is true that the legislature which
creates the administrative agency can at its discretion determine the scope of
its powers. But in the ultimate analysis "the limitations upon the reviewing
power of the courts are and must be self-imposed ones."' 25  If such is the
'See Hardwicke, Penalties as Affected by Good Faith Litigation (1934) 33 MICH.
L. REv. 40, 44, 45. Great latitude is allowed the government in fixing the size of
penalties. The Supreme Court of the United States approved a cumulative penalty of
$1,623,900, most of the penalty being figured at the rate of $1500 a day, for a violation
over a period of years of the Texas Anti-Trust Law by a corporation whose properties
were worth more than $40,000,000, and whose dividends have been as high as 700 per
cent per annum. See Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86. (1908).
'Noble v. Carlton, 36 F. (2d) (976) (S. D. Fla. 1930) ; Culver v. Smith, 74 S. W.
(2d) 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). In Missouri-Pacific Railway v. Tucker, 230 U. S.
340 (1913), the Court held that the imposition by a Kansas statute of a liability of
$500 as liquidated damages, together with a reasonable attorney's fee for every charge
by a common carrier in excess of the rates therein fixed, takes property without due
process of law. For other cases holding invalid statutes that set a minimum fine for
each offense, see Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. 150 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906) ;
Ex parte Wood, 155 Fed. 190 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1907); Consolidated Gas Co. v.
Mayer, 157 Fed. 849 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1907), reversed on other grounds, 212 U. S.
19 (1908).
'Three United States Supreme Court cases suspending penalties pendente lite are
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513, 521 (1913); St. Louis Irorr
Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63 (1919); Oklahoma
Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920). See also Coal & Coke Railway Co. v.
Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S. E. 613 (1910). See Hardwicke, Penalties As Affected
By Good Faith Litigation (1934) 33 MICH. L. Rv. 40.
-"See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 172 (1912); Reagan
v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 395 (1894) ; United States v. Delaware
& Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 417 (1909). For a more detailed discussion of the
scope of the Ex parte Young doctrine, see Black, At What Stage May a License Seek




situation with reference to legislative attempts at immunization, we should
expect that the same rule would apply where administrative agencies attempt to
immunize themselves against judicial review by so phrasing their orders as
to boldly assert in the language of the statute that they have given due con-
sideration to all of the elements which they were required to consider and
that their findings and orders were made upon the basis of such considera-
tion. In the case of Monroe Gaslight & Fuel Co. v. Michigan Public Utility
Commission,'26 the court made the following statement with reference to the
attempt on the part of an administrative agency to lift itself by its own boot-
straps:
"It will be noted, however, that pursuant to a common practice the
(Public Utility Commission) report seeks to immunize itself against
attack by a careful declaration that no one element is given controlling
effect in fixing the rate base, but that actual cost, investment, capitaliza-
tion, reconstruction costs, depreciation, etc., are given and each is given
due weight in reaching the final composite conclusion... We do not see
that an otherwise appropriate judicial revision can be escaped in this
manner. It is the duty of the court to determine the rate base from the
evidence before it; and while there must be great hesitancy in overturning
a conclusion reached by the Commission, after it has considered all rele-
vant facts, neither presumption nor expressed statement by the Com-
mission that it has given due weight to everyone can prevail against the
contrary inference required by the proofs."
Altlough the "Hot Oil" decision will be remembered especially for its
declaration as to the lack of a legislative standard in Section 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, it should be noted that the court also in
referring to the question of the necessity for administrative findings made it
clear that it did not intend to renounce its supervisory power over those
findings. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the court said:
"The first section is but a general introduction, it declares no policy
and defines no standard with respect to the transportation which is the
subject of Section 9(c). But if from the extremely broad description
contained in that section and the widely different matters to which the
section refers, it were possible to derive a statement of prerequisites to
the President's action under Section 9(c), it would still be necessary for
The President to comply with those conditions and to show that compli-
ance as the ground of his prohibition. 1 27
The court in elaborating its position said:
"We are concerned with the question of the delegation of legislative
power. If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating a
legislative order of an executive officer, or of a board or commission, due
'292 Fed. 139, 143, 144 (1923).
-'Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
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process of law requires that it shall appear that the order is within the
authority of the officer, board or commission, and if that authority de-
pends on determinations of fact, those determinations must be shown."
The court then quoted with approval from an earlier decision 128 to the-
effect that
"... when . .. an administrative agency is required as a condition
precedent to an order, to make a finding of facts, the validity of the
order must rest upon the needed finding. . . . If it'is lacking, the order
is ineffective. . . .We put this conclusion not only on the language of
the statute but also on general principles of constitutional government.
We cannot regard the President as immune from the application of these
constitutional principles."$
V2'Wichita R. R. and Light Co. v. Public Utility Comm., 260 U. S. 48, 59 (1922).
The second installment of this article, discussing the operation of the foregoing theoryr
in various specific fields of law, will appear in a subsequent issue.
